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The Evidence Base on College Size and Mergers in the Further Education Sector 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The document, Further Education Colleges – Models for Success sets out 
expectations for the future shape of the FE college sector.  Here we present the 
evidence base on college size and mergers to support the consultation document.  
The evidence base is presented in three chapters: the first chapter introduces the 
economic theory of market structure and applies this to the FE sector; the second 
chapter reviews the available literature; and the third chapter presents a quantitative 
analysis of the relationship between college size and performance. 
 
Overall, the theory, evidence and analysis suggest that there may be benefits to larger 
college size but these benefits are not guaranteed, and the impact of college mergers 
on choice and competition in FE is ambiguous.   
 
Economic theory suggests that there may be potential for larger colleges to be more 
efficient 
 
Traditional economic theory suggests that competitive markets are desirable because 
they are more efficient than less competitive market structures.  However, when 
economies of scale exist (i.e. when the average cost of production falls as production 
increases), monopolistic market structures might be more efficient than more 
competitive structures.  Consideration of the provision of FE suggests that there is a 
strong case for economies of scale (and scope). 
 
In the FE market there are 376 FE colleges, 1,755 schools with sixth forms, and a 
number of private training providers.  These organisations deliver skills and 
qualifications to 4.7 million learners.  At face value the market for FE is competitive: 
there are many firms offering a similar product to many consumers, and the largest 
market share of any college is only 1.12% (in terms of Standard Learner Numbers).  
However, the nature of consumption of education means that many consumers are 
constrained to providers within their local travel to learn area, which means that some 
providers may enjoy local monopoly powers (particularly in more rural areas). 
 
In private markets, merger proposals are assessed according to the extent to which 
they may be expected to reduce competition to the detriment of consumer welfare, but 
it is noted that in certain cases mergers can increase efficiency within markets.  These 
cases include: when economies of scale or scope allow mergers to make significant 
cost savings that can be passed on to consumers through lower prices or improved 
quality; or where greater critical mass enables merged entities to increase investment 
in R&D, stimulating greater innovation. 
 
Given the potential economies of scale and scope in FE provision, the creation of 
larger institutions through college merger may allow merged institutions to exploit cost 
savings, employ more efficient corporate services, increase investment in estates and 
R&D, diversify their curriculum offer, and better adapt to changes in policy or local 
conditions. 
 
However, college mergers will arguably reduce competition in the FE sector and the 
impact on learner and employer choice is ambiguous: choice over provider may be 
reduced whilst curriculum choice, for example, could feasibly increase.  Where merger 
is a response to failing provision, this arguably has a positive impact on choice where 
local provision is maintained as a result of merger. 
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The limited evidence available does not provide a consistent message 
 
There is very little evidence on the impact of college mergers, and the available 
evidence is not conclusive.  Research has identified potential benefits to college 
mergers, but also identifies risks.  An evaluation of a sample of mergers showed little 
evidence of short-term benefits and concluded that it was too early to assess the 
longer term impact of college mergers.  It appears that success of mergers is not 
guaranteed, but may be dependent on a complex set of local factors and conditions 
with no consistent message about when mergers are most likely to succeed. 
 
Some of the identified benefits of merger include: efficiencies through curriculum 
integration; reduction of over-provision; improved access to capital funds and 
betterment of estates. 
 
The research shows that the policy environment is a key driver of merger activity.  
Other identified drivers include key personnel with strategic vision, financial difficulties, 
enhancing core business, defence against competition, and strategic strengthening of 
position. 
 
Evidence from other sectors (higher education and business sectors) identifies lessons 
for colleges to learn from.  This evidence suggests that substantial cost savings from 
mergers in any sector are difficult to achieve; that communications and college culture 
are important; that mergers should be part of a business strategy with clear objectives; 
and the impact of mergers should be evaluated rigorously.   
 
Governments in Northern Ireland and Wales have recently taken the decision to move 
to a smaller network of regional colleges because they believe that greater critical 
mass will allow colleges to exploit economies of scale, improve the use of investment, 
increase coherence across the sector, and enhance the status of colleges.  The 
published reviews for both countries do not include any evidence that larger colleges 
are necessarily more effective, or that college mergers result in net benefits.  The 
Webb Review for the Welsh Assembly Government does cite evidence that efficiency 
savings could have a significant impact when an FE institution reaches a turnover of 
around £15 million, but this evidence is not provided in the report. 
 
Quantitative analysis does not suggest a strong relationship between college size and 
performance 
 
There is significant variation in college size in the English FE sector, with college 
income ranging from £5 million to £82 million.  There has been a recent 
unprecedented increase in merger activity in terms of the number of mergers proposed 
and the size of mergers. 
 
A quantitative analysis of the relationship between college size and performance 
shows that there is no evidence of a relationship between college size and success 
rates and no evidence of a relationship between college size and financial health.  
There is some evidence of a modest relationship between college size and OfSTED 
inspection grade – a larger proportion of larger colleges perform well, but larger 
colleges do not necessarily perform well, and colleges of any size can perform well. 
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Future work and recommendations 
 
This review of the theory, evidence and data has lead to a number of key research 
questions that future research and analysis could usefully focus on: 
• Economies of scale in FE – research to investigate the extent of economies of 
scale in FE, and assess whether there is a minimum viable scale for efficiency 
and/or an optimal college size beyond which colleges become less efficient. 
• The quantitative relationship between college size and performance – using 
sophisticated modelling techniques to identify the nature of any potential causal 
relationships between size and performance. 
• Evaluation of college mergers – provide a rigorous long-term evaluation of the 
impact of mergers across a range of indicators including local choice and 
competition, learner participation, retention, achievement and satisfaction, 
provider quality and finance.  Such an evaluation could also include proposed 
mergers to allow measurement of pre-merger baseline against which to 
longitudinally track progress. 
• Alternative organisational structures – research mapping the extent to which 
colleges across the sector act collaboratively or in partnership, and assess the 
potential for exploiting the benefits of size without the need for a formal merger. 
 
In conclusion, there is insufficient evidence that larger colleges necessarily perform 
better.  We have identified potential benefits to be gained through college merger, and 
potential risks.  The evidence suggests that potential benefits from merging are not 
guaranteed, and there is no consistent message about when mergers are more likely 
to succeed or fail.  On the basis of this evidence base, it is recommended that merger 
proposals are considered on a case-by-case basis: the key drivers for merging must 
be clearly understood, the aims clearly articulated, anticipated benefits evidenced and 
subject to risk analysis, and any approved mergers should be rigorously evaluated.  It 
is also recommended that a programme of further work be undertaken to better 
understand economies of scale and scope in FE, and to understand the impact of 
college mergers. 
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The Evidence Base on College Size and Mergers in the Further Education Sector 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The FE White Paper reforms advocated mergers as one method of eliminating under 
performance (as identified by minimum levels of performance (MLP) and inspection). 
However, mergers can also be proposed by colleges wishing to address other issues, 
such as to strengthen an already successful position.  
 
It is possible that the perceived influence of the 157 Group with the Ministerial team 
may be interpreted by the sector as implying that we want to see fewer, bigger 
colleges. In his speech to the 2007 AoC Conference, the Secretary of State stated that 
there is no evidence that larger colleges provided more effective education. He also 
questioned whether mergers were the way to go or whether we should be providing 
greater competition between providers. 
 
There is an unprecedented increase in college merger activity in terms of the number 
of mergers proposed and the size of the mergers (more colleges and often ones in 
large urban areas). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recent increase in activity is being driven by a 
feeling that sufficient mass will need to be developed to withstand fluctuations in 
demand-led income. 
 
There is also concern that colleges are proposing merger without proper consideration 
of other, less-formal, structural options, such as federations and Trusts, which are 
advocated in the White Paper as a means of spreading influence across the sector. 
 
This document aims to support the consultation paper by considering what the 
evidence says about college size, and whether there is any evidence to suggest that 
mergers should be encouraged across the sector, or whether they should be a cause 
for concern. 
 
Chapter one considers the economic theory behind market structure and merger 
activity, and discusses this in relation to the FE sector.  Chapter two provides a review 
of the available literature.  Finally, Chapter three presents a statistical analysis of 
administrative data and management information in order to establish whether there is 
any relationship between college size and performance. 
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1. WHAT DOES ECONOMIC THEORY SAY ABOUT MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND MERGERS, AND HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO THE FE SECTOR? 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
• Competitive markets are generally considered to be the most efficient 
market structure 
• Mergers can significantly reduce the level of competition within a 
market, and in private markets proposed mergers are investigated 
where it is thought that merger will impact negatively on consumers as 
a result of reduced competition. 
• However, where economies of scale or scope exist, a smaller number 
of larger firms can be more efficient than a perfectly competitive 
market structure; and mergers can increase efficiency and potentially 
lead to consumer benefits such as lower prices, improved quality, 
increased innovation, and greater choice. 
• At first glance the FE sector is competitive: there are a large number of 
providers offering a similar product to a large number of consumers.  
But the nature of consumption of education means that some 
providers may enjoy local monopoly powers, and the market is far 
from perfectly competitive. 
• It can be argued that economies of scale and scope exist in the 
provision of FE; therefore larger colleges (and colleges formed as a 
result of merger) could potentially be more efficient. 
• However, the impact of mergers on local choice and competition is 
ambiguous. 
• Therefore, proposed mergers need to be individually assessed in 
terms of their capacity to deliver efficiency savings for the benefit of 
consumers, and the associated risks (particularly in terms of local 
access, choice and competition). 
• Areas to be investigated further include the extent of economies of 
scale in FE and the implications in terms of minimum viable scale and 
optimal college size; and the extent to which alternative organisational 
structures could exploit economies of scale without the need for a 
formal merger. 
 
What does economic theory say about market structure? 
 
Perfectly competitive markets are desirable because they are assumed to be efficient; 
in general equilibrium, perfectly competitive markets deliver the conditions of pareto 
efficiency.1  Monopoly power occurs in markets where there are increasing returns to 
scale (average costs of production decrease as output increases), and this is 
considered to be a market failure. 
 
The key features of a competitive market are: 
• There are no restrictions on entry to or exit from the market 
• Existing firms have no advantage over potential new entrants 
                                                 
1 Pareto efficiency occurs when it is not possible to make at least one person in society better 
off, without making someone else in society worse off.  For more information on Pareto 
efficiency and the market see Chapter 2 of “Economics of the Public Sector”, Connolly & Munro 
(1999) 
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• There are many firms offering an identical product, and many consumers of 
that product. 
• All firms and consumers are completely informed 
• The prospect of persistent economic profit induces new entrants to the market, 
which increases supply, causing price to fall.  Therefore there are no economic 
profits in the long run. 
• Constant threat of competition spurs firms within the market to innovate to 
sustain their place in the market. 
 
The disadvantages of monopoly power (relative to perfectly competitive markets) 
include: 
• Barriers to entry allow firms to maintain higher prices (leading to allocative 
inefficiency) and lower quantity (therefore reducing consumer surplus). 
• Profit maximisation leads to productive inefficiency because monopoly firms do 
not produce at the lowest point on the average cost curve. 
• It can become easier for firms to collude 
• Less competition can lead to complacency amongst firms which in turn can 
lead to lower quality and less investment in new products (innovation). 
• Less choice for consumers 
 
In reality, very few markets are either perfectly competitive or purely monopolistic; 
markets vary along the spectrum in terms of degrees of competitiveness.  Ordinarily 
the view is that competition is desirable, and should be encouraged. 
 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) explains competition “as a process of rivalry between 
firms seeking to win customers’ business.  This process of rivalry, where it is effective, 
impels firms to deliver benefits to customers in terms of prices, quality and choice”.2 
 
However, competition is not always the most efficient market structure; where 
economies of scale (increasing returns to scale) and scope exist they can lead to what 
is known as a natural monopoly, where a single firm in the industry can produce at a 
lower average cost than a larger number of smaller firms can achieve.  It is possible for 
economies of scale and scope to be so large that a monopoly could be more efficient 
than a competitive market structure. 
 
In industries where natural monopoly powers exist, the government response is either 
to bring the industry under public ownership or regulate the industry to ensure that 
market power is not abused to detrimental effect for consumers. 
 
What does the theory say about mergers? 
 
A merger occurs when one firm buys another (or a majority or significant minority 
shareholding of another), two or more firms transfer or pool assets, or two or more 
firms jointly create a new firm.  There are three basic types of mergers: horizontal 
(mergers between firms operating in the same market); vertical (mergers between 
firms operating at different levels of industry supply chain); and conglomerate mergers 
(mergers between firms in different markets). 
 
Given that mergers reduce the number of firms operating within a market, mergers 
may lead to a significant reduction in competition within the market.  In private 
markets, OFT refer merger situations to the Competition Commission (CC) when they 
                                                 
2 Mergers Substantive Assessment Guidance, Enterprise Act 2002, OFT Publication (2003) 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft516.pdf 
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believe that there is a significant prospect that a merger may be expected to lessen 
competition substantially.  The concern over mergers is that: 
 
“When levels of rivalry are reduced (e.g. because customers have fewer firms 
among which to choose or because of coordinated behaviour between firms), 
the effectiveness of this process may diminish to the likely detriment of 
customers.”3 
 
Mergers may be detrimental for consumers if they result in a reduction in product 
choice, a rise in prices and reduction in output, or reduction in product quality or 
innovation. 
 
The possible anti-competitive effects of mergers can differ according to the type of 
merger: 
• Horizontal merger  
o Can reduce the level of competition in the market, and affect entry 
barriers and buyer power. 
o It can become profitable for the merged firm (and possibly other firms in 
the market) to increase price 
o Firms in the market may coordinate their behaviour to raise prices, 
reduce quality or curtail output. 
• Vertical merger 
o May foreclose market access by raising costs to rivals 
o May facilitate tacit collusion 
• Conglomerate merger 
o Such mergers rarely lead to substantial lessening of competition solely 
as a result of their conglomerate effects. 
o May increase feasibility of anti-competitive strategies or increase 
potential for coordination 
 
However, in certain cases a less competitive market structure can be more efficient, 
and under certain conditions mergers can increase efficiency. 
 
Efficiency gains are often claimed for mergers, but OFT guidance warns that 
prospective efficiency gains are more easily claimed than achieved.  Any potential 
efficiency gain must be shown to be merger-specific, and there must be evidence that 
the merged entity has the incentive to pursue these efficiencies and will pass a 
reasonable share of the benefits onto customers.  There are a number of ways in 
which merger can increase efficiency, most are argued to result from economies to 
scale or scope: 
• Lower Prices – merger may result in reduced marginal costs of production, 
which can lead to large cost savings that can (at least partly) be passed to 
customers in the form of lower prices 
• Quality Improvements – efficiencies may be passed on to consumers in the 
form of quality improvements 
• Greater Innovation – merger can potentially facilitate innovation through 
stimulating R&D that can only be achieved through a certain critical mass, 
especially where larger fixed (and sunk) costs are involved.  Rivalry can be 
increased through innovation. 
• Greater choice or higher quality – where merger increases the size of a 
network it can increase value to customers.  As institutions increase in size 
they can use scale economies to offer a wider choice to customers. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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• Increased competition - Where two or more smaller firms in the market gain 
efficiencies through merger that they are in a position to exert greater 
competitive pressure on larger competitors. 
 
If it can be shown that such efficiency gains will occur as a result of merger, and that 
firms have incentives to pass these benefits on to customers, these gains must then 
be assessed against the potential losses from reduced competition. 
 
In some conditions merger proposals can be accepted because of a ‘failing firm 
defence’: when the failing firm will rely on merger in order to remain in the market; 
where there is no realistic prospect of re-organising the business in a way that it could 
survive and recover; and where there is no less anti-competitive alternative to the 
merger. 
 
The acquisition of a failing firm that does result in a lessening of competition can result 
in customer benefits by ensuring continuing access to supply for customers, for 
example, and these benefits would also need to be assessed against potential 
detriments from reduced competition. 
 
 
How does this relate to the FE market? 
 
Two key features of the FE market make it unique:  first, the nature of consumption in 
FE means that national FE market is made up of a large number of local markets 
based on travel to learn areas, so any assessment of the market needs to reflect the 
geographical dimension; and second, providers in the FE sector can operate in the 
market for publicly-funded further education, privately-funded further education, or 
often a mix of both. 
 
The FE market consists of 196 general FE colleges, 96 Sixth Form Colleges, 49 
Tertiary colleges,  17 Agriculture and Horticulture colleges , 4 Art, Design and 
Performing Arts and 14 Special Designated Colleges (April 2008) and 1,755 schools 
with sixth forms delivering FE.4 In addition, there are a number of private training 
providers operating in the market.   
 
Market shares and the level of market concentration are measures that are typically 
used as indicators of competitive pressure within a market.  In terms of Standard 
Learner Number (SLN), the highest market share of a general FE college is 1.12%, 
and the top ten largest colleges account for less than 10% of total SLN.  However, due 
to the nature in which most provision is consumed (i.e. through attending provider 
institutions to receive education), it is possible that some providers may enjoy local 
monopoly powers – in certain rural locations there may only be one provider within a 
viable travel to learn area – so these indicators may be deceptive.   
 
We can assess the structure of the FE market against the key features of a 
competitive market set out earlier:  
 
A. There are no restrictions on entry to or exit from the market: The FE White 
Paper contains a commitment to encourage new providers into the sector 
either to take over failing provision or where expansion is required, rather than 
purely to increase competition. However, it could be argued that there are 
relatively high set-up costs associated with providing further education, and 
                                                 
4 All data taken from Edubase, end 2006/07, expect schools sixth form data which are taken 
from Schools and Pupils in England SFR 2006/07 
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that some of these cannot be recovered if the new entrant were to fail and be 
forced to exit (known as sunk costs).  Economies of scale or scope may result 
in a minimum viable scale needed for entry and potential new entrants to the 
sector may be deterred from attempting to enter on a large scale because of 
the risks involved. 
B. Existing firms have no advantage over potential new entrants – there may be 
an argument that college reputation and institutional history could give 
incumbents in the FE market an advantage over potential new entrants.  For 
example, a college with a proven track record with high success rates and 
good OfSTED inspection reports may have an advantage over a new entrant 
with no record when it comes to attracting learners. However, there is an 
alternative argument that new entrants may be more modern and attractive and 
possibly led by individuals with a proven track record. 
C. There are many firms offering an identical product, and many consumers of 
that product – there are 376 FE colleges in England providing FE for 4.7 million 
learners, and courses that award qualifications have a national curriculum to 
follow so in many ways the products are identical.  However, the picture of the 
national market can be misleading – the issue of choice and competition at the 
local level is discussed in more detail below. 
D. All firms and consumers are completely informed – government funds impartial 
information advice and guidance services to ensure that all consumers are fully 
informed about further education (opportunities, providers, courses and 
returns), and information about government-funded college activity is publicly 
available, therefore firms and consumers should have a good level of 
information about the FE market.5 
E. The prospect of persistent economic profit induces new entrants to the market, 
which increases supply, causing price to fall.  Therefore there are no economic 
profits in the long run – colleges can earn economic profits in the long run, but 
they are not for distribution. So the incentive is a stronger and more stable 
financial base and improved development potential. Private providers can, 
however, earn and distribute profits but there is limited scope for them entering 
the market and taking over provision currently delivered by colleges.  
F. Constant threat of competition spurs firms within the market to innovate to 
sustain their place in the market – The prospect of demand led funding is 
creating competition (or at least the perception of competition) - hence many 
mergers in FE are aimed at increasing size and strength.  
 
This simple assessment indicates that the FE market is not perfectly competitive, 
although there is some level of competition (which varies according to 
geography/rurality).  However, we have identified that where economies of scale and 
scope exist the most efficient market structure may be one with a smaller number of 
larger firms. 
 
Economies of Scale in FE 
 
Economies of scale exist when the cost of producing a unit of a good falls as output 
increases.  It is easy to consider this in the context of FE provision.  If a college wants 
to deliver a Basic Skills course to one person, the college needs to employ someone to 
teach the course, they need a room in which to deliver the course, they need relevant 
teaching materials, they need someone to organise the course and collect data etc.  If 
another person wanted to attend the course, the costs of the teacher, classroom and 
materials remains the same, and other costs may increase only slightly.  Therefore the 
average cost (the total cost of providing the course divided by the number of people 
                                                 
5 But this may not be perfect. 
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attending the course) falls as the number of learners rise.  These economies are 
known as “technical economies”.  Other types of potential economies are discussed 
below: 
• Managerial economies - where larger colleges benefit from having specialist 
managers and being able to attract more expert staff.  Larger colleges may 
also have better or more efficient corporate services (e.g. estates, HR, and 
finance). 
• Marketing economies – some costs associated with publicity and promotion 
would be the same regardless of size, so average advertising costs fall as size 
increases; larger colleges may be able to achieve savings in procurement 
through bulk buying; and employer engagement can be more efficient if run 
from one college rather than being a duplicated function across colleges within 
an area.6 
• Financial economies – larger colleges may be able to exploit improved access 
to capital funds and better terms from financial organisations.  In some cases 
larger colleges could use their existing assets to fund redevelopment of 
estates.  Where neighbouring colleges merge, surpluses from one partner can 
be used for expansion and redevelopment in the other. 
• Risk-bearing economies - larger colleges may be better positioned to 
successfully adapt to changes in policy, local labour markets, or demography, 
for example, and may be able to expand their curriculum to diversify interests.7 
 
Economies of scope exist when an increase in the range of goods or services brings a 
decrease in average cost, which occurs when specialised or expensive technical 
inputs can be shared by different goods.  In the FE context we can understand this by 
considering college facilities: it is cheaper for one college to provide A levels and basic 
skills than it is for one college to provide A levels whilst another provides basic skills.  
Facilities such as class rooms, libraries, canteens, computer networks etc can be 
shared across a broad range of courses – and even specialised courses that require 
highly specialised equipment can be shared across subject areas and qualification 
levels (e.g. it is cheaper for one laboratory to be used to deliver A level biology and an 
Access course in health sciences than it is for one college to have a laboratory to 
deliver only A level biology and another college to have a laboratory to deliver Access 
course in health sciences).  
 
It should be noted that large institutions may not be able to exploit economies of scale 
when large numbers of students are spread in small numbers over a diverse set of 
programmes or locations. 
 
Can mergers between FE colleges improved efficiency in the market? 
 
We would usually expect mergers in FE to be horizontal mergers – i.e. merging with 
another provider in the FE sector; although some may be vertical (e.g. college merging 
with university or school). 
 
Clearly, the high fixed costs associated with premises and learning resources in further 
education yield increasing returns to scale therefore there may be a case that larger 
colleges (and colleges that become larger as a result of merger) could be more 
efficient, but any identifiable efficiency gains must be weighed up against potential 
                                                 
6 This is arguably more efficient for local employers as well, who only have to have one 
conversation. 
7 Forming larger colleges may reduce risks for the colleges themselves, but could place greater 
risk on the community they serve – e.g. if the monopoly provider fails. 
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detrimental effects before advocating a system of larger colleges and encouraging 
mergers across the sector. 
 
In some cases mergers are proposed as a way of saving failing colleges8.  Where one 
of the merging colleges is thought to be failing, we need to consider what would 
otherwise happen without merger.  If the college were to fail, the LSC may commission 
provision from local competitors (who may be the parties involved in merger), and 
there could be a reduction in choice or access for the local community.  In such 
scenarios a merger is not likely to substantially lessen competition in relation to the 
alternative, and merger may provide an opportunity to ensure local access to provision 
is maintained.   
 
Consumer power can constrain the ability of merged entities to act in ways that reduce 
efficiency, mainly by switching (or credibly threatening to switch) to another supplier.  
Consumers of FE (learners and employers) can in theory switch provider relatively 
freely, but they may be constrained by their travel to learn area.  Evidence suggests 
that learners are prepared to travel further for higher level (level 3 and above) 
qualifications9.  In addition, there are various initiatives like learner panels and student 
governors that exist to strengthen the learner voice which should theoretically increase 
consumer power in FE. The key questions to address when considering proposals to 
merge are whether learners and employers will have a sufficiently strong post-merger 
bargaining position, and how much it will change as a result of the merger. 
 
It is worth noting that the FE sector is regulated to ensure that quality standards are 
met, for example through minimum levels of performance and inspection, which should 
prevent colleges from abusing any market power at the expense of learners. 
 
What is the impact of college mergers on choice? 
 
First, it is important to remind ourselves that the FE system allows learners and 
employers free choice over which provider they attend; it is the existing attachment of 
an individual to an area that may restrict choice in practice.10  So whilst we consider 
choice in the context of a travel to learn area, there is no systemic reason why learners 
and employers can’t attend any of the 376 colleges in England. 
 
A number of factors will determine the impact of a merger on learner choice.  The first 
is the geographical dimension.  If we consider a case where one college operates in a 
small town, and is the only college within the local travel to learn area, and this college 
decides to merge with a college in a neighbouring travel to learn area - provided that 
both estates are maintained post-merger, there will be no reduction in choice because 
there was only one provider before, and one provider after merger within each travel to 
learn area.  However, if we consider an alternative case, where 3 urban colleges are 
located close together within the same travel to learn area, and these colleges decide 
to merge, choice over FE provider will be reduced. 
 
It is important to consider the different types of choice: 
• Where – choice over which college or campus to attend 
                                                 
8 Around half of the current merger proposals relate to colleges with poor quality or financial 
viability where the future of the college is at risk. 
9 See table 3:14 in Future Size and Structure of the Further Education Sector in Northern 
Ireland, Economic Appraisal Report for the Department for Employment and Learning (2005), 
which is supported by internal DIUS analysis. 
10 For example, potential learners may have work or personal commitments that restrict them 
from moving to a different area in order to attend a certain college. 
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• Who – choice over teacher/lecturer 
• What – choice in terms of curriculum offer 
• When – choice over time of day, or day of week to receive education 
• How – whether to receive education through face-to-face tuition, distance 
learning, or e-learning. 
 
An initial assumption when considering choice may be that larger colleges, or mergers, 
may act to reduce choice because they reduce the number of providers available for 
learners and employers to choose from.  However, whilst choice over provider may 
reduce as a result of merger, we need to consider the impact of size or merger on 
other aspects of choice. 
 
One of the identified potential benefits of economies of scale is greater choice, 
particularly in terms of the curriculum offer.  Small colleges may be able to offer 
efficient provision by restricting choice, but larger colleges may be able to use their 
economies of scale to offer a wider choice to learners and employers.11 
 
Similarly, colleges with a larger critical mass may be able to offer wider choice in terms 
of course tutors and timetables – e.g. if a larger college has 100 learners wanting to 
study NVQ2 in Construction, the college could offer a range courses with different 
timetables; whilst a smaller college with, say, only 10 learners wanting to study the 
same course would only be able to offer one option in terms of timetable.12 
 
Is there a minimum viable scale or an optimal college size? 
 
Whilst the discussion of economic theory in relation to the FE market suggests that 
there may be efficiencies associated with larger colleges, there is a question about the 
minimum size at which colleges can enjoy these efficiencies, and whether there is a 
limit to economies of scale such that beyond a certain size the college will become 
less efficient – i.e. whether some organisations could become unmanageably large.  
This requires further investigation. 
 
Are there alternatives to formal mergers that can deliver similar benefits at 
reduced risk? 
 
The discussion presented here has focussed on small versus large providers, and has 
looked at the possible effects of a merger in relation to a situation where all providers 
in the market operate independently and competitively.  However, in reality providers 
may act cooperatively, collaboratively, in partnership, or as a federation without 
formally merging.  It is possible that some organisational form in between independent 
non-coordination and formal merger could reap some of the benefits of size without 
incurring the full costs of reduced competition.  These organisational structures should 
be fully investigated and evaluated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a clear argument that the presence of scale economies in the provision of 
further education may mean that a perfectly competitive market for FE is not the most 
efficient market structure.  However, whilst there may be benefits to gain from 
                                                 
11 This was a finding of the LSDA report Size Matters: economies of scale in schools and 
colleges by Owen, Fletcher and Lester (2006) 
12 In theory, the college could offer additional options but this would be at extra cost to the 
college and therefore less efficient. 
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increasing college size, these need to be carefully weighed against risks of reduced 
community access and other detrimental effects from reduced competition. 
 
The impact of college mergers on learner and employer choice is ambiguous: in some 
cases it could be possible that choice over provider may be reduced whilst choice over 
curriculum is increased. 
 
The discussion suggests that, whilst it may be possible, there is no guarantee that 
mergers will increase overall efficiency and impact positively on learner and employer 
choice.  Each merger should be carefully considered on an individual basis to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence that gains will be realised, and that 
these gains outweigh any possible costs from reduced choice and competition. 
 
Future research could usefully focus on assessing the impact of mergers on choice 
and competition, and evaluating the realisation of benefits.  Research could also 
investigate minimum viable scale for efficient operation, optimal college size, and the 
different types of organisation collaboration that could increase efficiency.  
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2. WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SAY ABOUT MERGERS IN FE? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
• There is an absence of well-founded evidence on college mergers and 
the quality of available evidence is variable. The available evidence is 
emergent and in need of further development. 
• Whilst it is possible to identify real benefits that have resulted from 
specific mergers, context is all-important and it would be unwise to 
generalise on the basis of the evidence available. 
• Overall, the evidence would indicate that there were comparatively few 
short-term benefits realised from the merger process and that the 
outcomes from partnership and collaboration were mixed.  
• A number of potential benefits and risks to merger success are 
identified, but there is no consistent message about conditions in which 
mergers should take place, and when they will succeed.  There is no 
‘one size fits all’ approach that can be applied. 
• The policy environment is a key driver of activity. Success of mergers is 
likely to depend on drivers for merger, planning, environment, buy-in 
etc, but each merger should be considered individually (which is 
consistent with existing procedure).   
• Some evidence on mergers is available from other sectors – HE and 
business – which identifies lessons that colleges can learn from 
• Information is available from other countries on planned mergers 
(Northern Ireland and Wales) and their reasons for instigating such a 
change. However, there is no consistent evidence that larger colleges 
are necessarily more effective. 
• A long-term evaluation of mergers is needed to provide a quantitative 
assessment of long-term benefits. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the available evidence on the impact of mergers in 
the further education sector.  A number of documents have been reviewed to establish 
the available quantitative and qualitative evidence on mergers, and these are listed in 
Annex 1.     
 
1. Evidence Base  
 
The overall conclusion from the reports reviewed is that there is an absence of well-
founded evidence about college mergers in England in recent years, and that the 
evidence is emergent and in need of further development13. (LSC 2007 & Stewart 
2003) 
 
A number of reports have looked at mergers since incorporation in 1993 and some 
insights could be gained from looking at inspection reports.  However, there appears to 
only be one major study specifically evaluating mergers, undertaken by DfES jointly 
with the LSC in 2002 (DfES 2003). This study evaluated a sample of seventeen 
mergers between 1996 and 2000, focussing on the pre-merger conditions that were 
most likely to influence the success of a merger and synthesises the key issues and 
                                                 
13 There are a number of discussion papers but little in the way of evidence. 
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concerns that should be taken into account by any organisation considering mergers in 
the future.  
 
A rapid review of the evidence for the LSC (2007) concluded that it is difficult to 
establish the effects of mergers and collaboration on issues such as learner 
participation, attainment and progression because of the different configurations in 
different localities and the impact of wider influences, such as the labour market. In 
particular this was due to a lack of systematic data collection on programme outcomes 
and a failure to produce performance measures.   The evidence base for under-
pinning outcomes for learners, staff and the FE institution is relatively sparse 
 
Similarly Stewart (2003) found very little objective assessment of the sector. Stewart 
argues that the absence of any well grounded analysis of the experience is of 
particular concern, because (i) the process is costly, and (ii) no analysis can be used 
to inform the actions of those colleges becoming involved in mergers. 
 
Stewart (2003) found a considerable amount of research on mergers from business 
and Higher Education, which is used to suggest lessons colleges can learn.  
 
2. Definitions 
 
Mergers, collaboration and partnerships are distinct but clearly related concepts. The 
LSC rapid review found no evidence of a definition of ‘merger’ in the FE context, 
however, the concept is widely linked in economic theory to acquisition as part of the 
concept of growth of organisations or as means of rationalising the structure of 
declining industries.  (LSC 2007) 
 
The report concluded that in the absence of a single simple and widely agreed 
definition, there can be problems identifying what actually constitutes ‘merger’ as an 
activity, process or outcome.  The definition of merger is usually defined (implicitly) by 
the researchers within the specific research context. 
 
 
3. Review of Available Evidence 
 
The DfES report (2003) on mergers carried out between 1996 and 2000 concluded 
that there was no consistent evidence on the overall impact or success of college 
mergers.  However, the authors note that in merger cases ‘it is too soon to tell’ with 
regards impact of merger on quality of provision, on retention or achievement and on 
full implementation of all merger aims.   
 
Key points to note were: 
• There was evidence of economies of scale, particularly for mergers of other 
specialist colleges; 
• Curriculum integration provided efficiencies, especially for mergers of GFE 
colleges in urban areas; 
• Where mergers took place within cities, they were especially effective in 
reducing over-provision of further education and allowing a reduction in 
competition; 
• There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach; 
• One of the significant benefits appeared to be the enhanced possibility of 
betterment of estates and facilities, as well as size which allowed easier 
bidding, borrowing and access to capital funds. 
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• Clear evidence that colleges which had poor financial histories and little site 
investment benefitted markedly and rapidly through merger with a larger, richer 
partner. 
 
However: 
• It was not possible to reach a conclusion about optimum size since much 
depends on particular circumstances; 
• No consistent evidence to suggest that merger, in itself, is guaranteed to 
produce long-term financial benefits; 
• Impact of merger on levels of student achievement appeared markedly variable 
and often dependant upon specific programme area activity. 
• Showed relatively few short-term benefits after completion of a lengthy merger 
process; 
• Respondents felt that it would take from three to ten years to complete a 
merger;  
 
4. Drivers 
 
The policy environment is a key driver of activity. There are policy tensions as the 
drivers for institutional collaboration are not as strong as the drivers for institutional 
competition. (LSC 2007)   However, there is a belief that there are benefits of 
partnership and collaboration, which is seen as an established way in which to provide 
integrated approaches to complex, multi-dimensional and multi-agency policy 
challenges. 
 
The literature identified a number of other key drivers: 
• Personnel – for example, a strong principal with strategic vision 
• Financial  - financial desperation or fear of closure 
• Core Business – search to develop new strategic position, curriculum 
complementarities leading to growth or enhanced provision 
• Defensive – undertaken to prevent access by a competitor 
• Strategic - reduction of intense local competition, development of strength 
through larger size 
 
A number of factors external to the institution were also identified, such as funding, 
inspection and targets, which were very influential in determining institutional 
behaviour.  
 
5. Economies of Scale in Further Education 
 
A report for the Learning and Skills Development Agency (LSDA, 2006) reviewed the 
relationship in England between institutional size and the cost of delivering Level 3 
(mainly A Level) provision in Sixth Form Colleges, General FE colleges and School 
Sixth Forms.  The study used empirical analysis and modelling to illustrate the 
potential scale of efficiency gains.  The main finding was that economies of scale exist 
and FE institutions need a substantial number of students in order to fully exploit 
these; consequently colleges operating on a small scale incur cost penalties. 
 
The authors note that this study is only an initial assessment of evidence in this 
important area: it is not a definitive analysis. 
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Key points to note were: 
• Small institutions can offer efficient provision but only by restricting choice thus 
larger institutions offer significant advantages in terms of cost and learner 
choice. 
• LSC data for 2002/03 College Accounts suggest evidence of economies of 
scale for both teaching staff costs (as expected) and administration staff costs 
(more than expected). 
• The accounting data only show “revealed” economies of scale – i.e. economies 
of scale that are observable once colleges may have already used part of the 
potential economies of scale to improve the student experience.  Revealed 
economies of scale represented savings of around 10% of income. 
• The main advantage of scale is the ability to teach a reasonably large/broad 
programme in classes of larger than average size – there is evidence that 
subject choice widened as size increased. 
• Two types of economies of scale were investigated: that larger institutions offer 
a given set of subjects more cost effectively; and they offer a wider range of 
subjects and are more effective than smaller institutions. 
• Results should be considered tentative early estimates from a small-scale 
piece of research limited by data availability. 
• Those interviewed as part of the case studies consistently reported that 
economies of scale exist and are important, and this was considered by the 
authors to be crucial. 
 
 
6. Evidence from other sectors 
 
Stewart (2003) reviewed the evidence from mergers between HE institutions, and in 
business and identified a number of clear lessons colleges can learn.   These 
included:  
• Cost savings – experience from all sectors suggests that substantial savings 
from mergers in any sector are difficult to achieve. 
• Merger processes are multi-dimensional – Although mergers concentrate on 
hard issues, for example, finance, other factors are central to the process such 
as communication and the issue of college culture. 
• Merger as part of the business strategy – An objective analysis of its purpose 
should form the basis for the project. 
• Merger objectives – aims should be framed in more specific terms, for example, 
‘to improve the post-16 curriculum in area X’. 
• Merger evaluation – rigorous and objective evaluation of the aims, and the 
extent to which they have been achieved. 
 
The LSC (2007) report provides some insight into a range of outcomes affecting 
learners in mergers between FE and HE institutions. These may be realised in some, 
but not all, cases and are contingent upon a complex set of local factors and 
conditions. The outcomes included: 
 
• Some growth in student numbers, particularly part-time provision; 
• Development of well-articulated progression routes between FE and HE 
(although not in the short-term); 
• Improvements in retention and completion rates in both FE and HE provision 
previously offered by FE colleges; 
• However, there was little direct evidence of improved quality of the learning 
experience. 
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7. Evidence from other countries 
 
Governments in Northern Ireland and Wales have recently taken the decision to move 
to a smaller network of regional colleges. 
 
Prior to a change in 2007, the Northern Ireland (NI) college network varied 
considerably in size, and college size was deemed to have a bearing on the ability of 
individual colleges to deliver against the Department’s strategic aims and objectives.  
An economic appraisal was carried out in response to the Review ‘FE Means 
Business’. The report recommended moving away from the sixteen colleges to six 
(regional) colleges (from 13,000 to 30,000 enrolments), based on their economic 
appraisal of monetary costs, and the evaluation of weighted criteria. 
 
The report identifies the following key benefits of having a smaller number of larger 
colleges:  
- greater critical mass and collaboration rather than competition, leading to better 
use of investment;  
- critical mass should result in benefits from economies of scale; 
- greater coherence across the sector leading to more effective delivery of 
strategic agenda; and, 
- enhanced status of FE colleges. 
 
The following risks were also identified: 
- lack of continuing ease of geographical access; 
- potential loss of local identity; 
- turbulence; and, 
- loss of high quality staff during implementation. 
 
No evidence was cited that larger colleges are necessarily more effective. 
 
In 2007 Wales undertook a policy review of the mission and purpose of their further 
education sector. It also incorporated an analysis of the wider role of the sector 
including developments in 14-19 education and training, the interface of HE provision, 
responsiveness to skills needs of employers and the economy and adult learning, 
social justice and community engagement.  
 
The report proposed a programme of re-configuration to ensure that all FE Institutions 
(FEIs) are operating at a minimum size level – a process that will lead to a reduction of 
management units, not delivery points. Re-sizing might be achieved through 
federation, merger, or the creation of a new college.  Two of the report’s 
recommendations for (FEIs) were: 
(i) that within two years the Department should reconfigure FEIs to ensure that no 
stand-alone institution has a turnover below £15m; and, 
(ii) within 5 years, ensure that each consortium has a single FEI by process of merger 
or federation of FEIs, each of which has a turnover of substantially more that £15m. 
 
The review refers to evidence from benchmarking exercises undertaken by individual 
FE colleges that size does matter. However, the evidence is not provided in the report. 
The review argues that larger units are more flexible for many different purposes: 
curriculum, timetabling, employer support. This is particularly so where there is a focus 
on vocational learning which often needs expensive plant. It also cites research that 
indicates efficiency savings in terms of resource overheads, administration and 
management could have a significant impact when an FE institution reaches a 
turnover of c. £15m (Welsh Assembly Government 2007 p, 82)  
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8. Future research 
 
This review has identified that there is a need to conduct some further research to 
provide robust, long-term evidence on the “success” of mergers between FE colleges. 
 
As far as we are aware, two projects are currently underway: 
 
(i) The LSC has recently commissioned a piece of work “Evaluating the impact 
of FE collaboration: Developing a tool-kit for evaluation”.   This project will 
develop an evaluation tool-kit to help track the short and long term impact and relative 
success of new models of working, across a range of performance indicators.  At this 
stage, the aim of the tool-kit will be to identify: 
•  what merger/ collaboration work is underway;  
• What stage the colleges involved are along the process; 
• Track short- to long term impact of these collaborations; 
• Identify emerging issues or causes for concern; and, 
• Sharing best practice. 
 
The anticipated completion date is September 2008. 
 
(ii) The CfBT Education Trust has a commissioned a report looking at 
educational structures in the FE sector (forthcoming).  This report includes a section 
on college mergers, which identifies the drivers for merger, and argues that economies 
of scale offer financial advantages to larger colleges.  The report also identifies 
problems with a competitive local climate (such as disincentives to invest in 
disadvantaged groups).  However, it is noted that merger alone is not sufficient to 
secure quality improvement, and that the evidence is not conclusive (benefits are 
frequently overstated pre-merger and are slow to materialise).  The report cites 
evidence that large colleges are consistently found to have the ability to take a broader 
view of local need than local institutions.  In their assessment, the majority of mergers 
over the past decade have been motivated by problems with finance and standards 
and a need to survive, but increasingly mergers are being driven by a desire to bring 
together successful colleges to create an organisation better able to meet sub-regional 
needs and adapt to changes in policy. 
 
 
Some further research suggestions include: 
 
(iii) To complement the work of the LSC above a further possibility is to carry out a 
repeat of Warwick study – based on an in-depth analysis of recently merged colleges.  
Ideally this would include a pre- and post- quantitative assessment of the college 
‘performance’ across a range of measures, as well as in-depth case studies with a 
number of colleges.  Evidence from the review suggests that a longer time frame for 
monitoring impacts is required, possibly 2-3 years after the merger, as short-term 
benefits are minimal.  
 
(iv) An evaluation of a forth-coming merger. This would allow us to get reliable pre-
merger baseline and monitor impact over time, try to understand the drivers and 
intended benefits and assess whether these have been realised. 
 
(v)  A qualitative study examining in more detail the drivers for merger to see 
whether they have changed in nature or grown stronger over time, or might change as 
a result of the White paper reforms and the move to demand-led funding.  This could 
also include a review of collaborative activity to see the extent to which some colleges 
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are exploiting advantages of merger without losing individual identity and status, 
possibly including views from non-merged institutions to establish what (if any) 
discussions have been taking place on the issues on merger and what the issues are 
for them. 
 
(vi) A quantitative comparison of the effects of competition and collaboration on 
college performance, across a range of measures. 
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3. IS THERE A QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLEGE SIZE 
AND PERFORMANCE? 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY: 
 
• Since publication of the Foster Review there has been a significant rise 
in the number of proposed mergers. 
• Across the FE sector there is a significant variation in size of GFECs in 
terms of income and standard learner numbers. 
• There is no evidence of a relationship between college size and success 
rates. 
• There is some correlation between size and average OfSTED inspection 
grade, but the correlation coefficient is small and does not suggest a 
strong relationship. 
• Larger colleges may show less variation in performance, but any college 
can achieve poor or outstanding performance regardless of size. 
• There is no relationship between college size and financial health. 
• There is no evidence to suggest that merged institutions perform any 
better or worse than institutions that have not been involved in a 
merger. 
• Further analysis and research is needed to better understand the 
relationship between college size and performance, and the impact of 
college mergers, and to address the issue of causality. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore the links between college size and 
performance using administrative data and Management Information from the LSC and 
OfSTED, to determine whether there is any evidence that larger colleges perform 
better, or that mergers between FE colleges should be encouraged. 
 
The analysis will address the following key questions: 
1. What is the current level of variation in college size and performance? 14 
2. Is there any evidence that a relationship exists between college size and 
performance? 
3. Do colleges that have been involved in mergers perform better than those that 
have not? 
 
There are other key analytical questions that are important to the discussion, but fall 
outside the scope of this analysis.  These include: 
• What is the impact of merging on college size and performance? 
• What is the impact of merging on the level of choice and competition within 
travel to learn areas? 
• Is there a minimum viable size for colleges to operate successfully?  
• Is there an optimal college size (i.e. is there a limit to economies of scale 
beyond which colleges become unmanageable or less efficient)? 
 
                                                 
14 Throughout the analysis we will use a variety of indictors for size and performance 
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ANALYSIS 
 
It is important to include a cautionary note on causality: if a relationship between 
college size and performance can be identified, it does not necessarily follow that 
larger colleges perform well because they are large.  It may be the case that high 
performing colleges can grow because of their success; therefore large colleges may 
be large because they are high performers.  Alternatively, there may be external 
factors that affect both size and performance.  If there is a relationship between 
college size and performance, but we can not be sure that larger size causes colleges 
to perform better, then we can not be sure that increasing college size will necessarily 
improve performance. 
 
Data 
The analysis uses the following data: 
• Information from DIUS policy colleagues on merger activity from 1993 to 2008. 
• College income data taken from the financial data return for 2006/07, published 
by the LSC: 
http://www.lsc.gov.uk/publications/latestdocuments/Detail.htm?id=d048ca13-
bf1d-4631-bd85-615151b0f547 
• Provider level success rates - which are an early view of the 2006/07 figures 
taken from the LSC demand led funding (DLF) model. 
• Standard Learner Numbers (SLN) – also taken from the DLF model. 
• Headline inspection grade data for GFECs inspected between August 2005 
and February 2008 in cycle 2 of the Common Inspection Framework (CIF). 
• Financial health data – from LSC provider financial returns 
 
The analysis is restricted to GFECs to ensure results are not affected by inherent 
differences in institutional performance.  Analysis using OfSTED data is restricted to 
the 150 GFECs that were inspected between August 2005 and February 2008. 
 
Recent Merger Activity 
 
Number of College Mergers each year: 1993-2008*
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Creation of LSC   Publication of Foster Review
 *Data for 2008 include one merger that has already taken place, 2 mergers that have been 
agreed (and due to take place in April), and 8 proposed mergers.  This is the latest available 
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information from the LSC, the number of proposals for 2008 could increase, but not all 
proposals are guaranteed to go ahead. 
 
Since 1993, 72 mergers have taken place (including one in January 2008), and we 
expect up to 10 more mergers this year.15 
 
 
1) What is the current level of variation in college size and performance? 
 
Distribution of College Size (Income)
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MEAN INCOME = £23m
 
 
Of the 243 GFECs for which we have data on income, income ranges from £5m to 
£82m.  The largest 30 colleges account for 25% of total GFEC income. 
 
For the purpose of this analysis we can use upper and lower quartiles to define 
whether a college is small, medium, or large.  The lower quartile of colleges are below 
£14m income, and the upper quartile are above £29m, therefore we define a small 
college as one with less than £14m income, large as over £29m income, and medium 
as between £14m and £29m. 
 
Although there may be an impression that merged colleges are necessarily large, 
there is significant variation in size, in terms of income, between merged colleges. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Some colleges merged before incorporation in 1993, but these have not been included. 
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Distribution of size amongst merged colleges
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Amongst the merged colleges, income ranges from £12m to £82m.  Merged colleges 
account for 24% of total GFEC income. 
 
College income is not the only way to measure college size.  An alternative is to use 
the Standard Learner Number which is the LSC preferred measure of Full Time 
Equivalent (FTE) learners. 
 
Distribution of College Size (SLN)
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College size in terms of SLN ranges from 150 to 12,520, and the top 33 colleges 
account for 25% of total SLN16. 
 
                                                 
16 There are 250 GFECs for which we have SLN data. 
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The lower quartile of colleges are below 2,760 SLN , and the upper quartile are above 
5,850 SLN, therefore a small college is defined as one with less than 2,760, large as 
over 5,850 SLN, and medium as between 2,760 and 5,850 SLN. 
 
 
Distribution of Merged Colleges (SLN)
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Amongst the merged colleges, size in terms of SLN ranges from 1,640 to 9,590 and 
merged colleges account for 17% of total SLN. 
 
2) Is there any evidence of a link between college size and performance? 
 
We have used a number of indicators for size and performance to examine whether 
there is any link between college size and performance.  For size we have looked at 
college income and SLN, and for performance we have used success rates, OfSTED 
inspection grade data, and financial health data.  The following analysis shows the 
extent to which these indicators of size and performance are correlated.  For each 
relationship we have shown a scatter plot, correlation coefficient and, where useful, a 
table showing the probability (%) for each size band of being in each performance 
band. 
 
2.1. a) Size (income) v Success Rates 
There are 254 GFECs in the DLF model. Section 2.1 is based on 243 of these for 
whom both success rate and income data were available. 
 
Chart 2.1.a shows the relationship between college income and success rates. 
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Chart 2.1a) Size (income) v Success rate
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The correlation coefficient is 0.08 which suggest a weak correlation between income 
and success rates. 
 
The table below shows the probability (%) of being in each performance band 
(success rate) for each size band (income). 
 
Performance Band (success rate)  
<67% 67 to 70 71 to 74 75% + 
Colleges 
in band 
29m + 19 22 27 32 61
14m to 29m 24 26 25 24 123
Size Band 
(Income 
£m) Below 14 m 31 26 21 21 59
 
Although a lower proportion of large colleges show poor performance, and a lower 
proportion of small colleges show high performance, this grid shows that any college 
can show good performance regardless of size. 
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2.1. b) Size (SLN) v Success Rates 
Chart 2.1b) Size (SLN) v Success rate
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Using SLN as a measure of size gives a slightly lower correlation coefficient of 0.06 
which suggests that there is little evidence of a relationship. 
 
Performance Band (success rate) 
  <67% 67 to 70 71-74 75%+ 
Colleges 
in Band 
Below 2760 28 25 22 25 60 
2760-5850 25 28 25 22 122 Size 
Band 
(SLN) 
Above 
5850 21 20 26 33 61 
 
Again, the grid showing the probability for each size band of being in each 
performance band shows that whilst a larger proportion of larger colleges do well, 
colleges of any size can achieve high performance. 
 
2.2. a) Size (income) v Average Inspection Grade 
There are 150 GFECs that were inspected between August 2005 and February 2008 
in cycle 2 of the Common Inspection Framework (CIF), so not all of the 243 GFECs 
included in the previous section looking at success rates are included here. 
 
The chart below shows the relationship between income and average OfSTED 
inspection grade. 
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Chart 2.2a) Size (income) v Average inspection grade
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Although there is less variation for larger colleges in terms of average inspection 
grade, smaller colleges can achieve equally high average inspection grade scores.  
The correlation coefficient is -0.22 which suggests a modest correlation.17 
 
Performance Band (Average Inspection))  
4 to 2.75 2.75 to 1.75 1 to 1.75 
Colleges 
in band 
29m + 17 40 43 35
14m to 29m 39 36 25 72
Size Band 
(Income 
£m) Below 14 m 40 23 37 43
 
The probability (%) of being in each performance band (average inspection) for each 
size band (income) is shown above.  Again, although a greater proportion of larger 
colleges are outstanding or good, 21% of smaller colleges have average inspection 
grades between 1 and 1.75.  Medium sized colleges are evenly distributed across the 
average inspection grade performance bands. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The coefficient is negative because OfSTED grade of 1 is outstanding and 4 is inadequate. 
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2.2.b) Size (SLN) v Inspection Grade 
Chart 2.2b) Size (SLN) v Average inspection grade
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The correlation coefficient is -0.26 which again suggests a modest relationship that is 
very slightly higher using SLN instead of income as an indicator of size. 
 
We have presented inspection grade data as an average across the three aspect 
grades (Leadership & Management, Quality of Provision, and Achievements & 
Standards) and Capacity to Improve.  Annex 2 shows the scatter plots and correlation 
coefficients for each individual aspect, Capacity to Improve, and the overall inspection 
grade.  These show a consistent message in terms of a lack of evidence for a strong 
relationship between income and inspection grade performance.  The strongest (but 
still modest) coefficients are for leadership & management, capacity to improve, and 
quality of provision (-0.24,-0.23, and -0.22 respectively); whilst the correlation 
coefficients for achievements & standards and overall inspection are lower (-0.10 and -
0.15 respectively). 
 
2.3. a) Size (income) v Financial Health 
 
The following charts are based on data from the LSC provider financial returns 
mentioned above and include the same 243 colleges used in section 2.1. Financial 
health grade gives an indication of whether a provider is operating in surplus or deficit. 
Grade 1 represents the best performance and grade 3 the worst. 
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Chart 2.3a) Size (income) v Financial health grade
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The correlation coefficient is -0.029 which shows that there is insufficient evidence of a 
link between income and financial health.18 
 
2.3. b) Size (SLN) v Financial Health 
Chart 2.3b) Size (SLN) v Financial health grade
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Correlation coefficient for SLN and financial health grade is -0.08 which again is not 
suggestive of a relationship. 
 
                                                 
18 There are no tables showing the probability (%) of each size band being in each financial 
health indicator because the distribution of overall grades for financial health is not even so 
results would be misleading. 
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3) Do merged colleges perform better? 
 
It is worth re-iterating that merged colleges are not necessarily the biggest colleges; 
although the largest college in terms of income is a merged college (City College 
Manchester), only 5 of the top 10 largest colleges are mergers, and income of merged 
colleges ranges from £12m to £82m. 
 
Data on the number of mergers show there to have been 72 mergers since 1993, and 
these have created 43 merged institutions.19  All of the scatter plots in section 2 
identify the colleges that have merged since 1993 compared to all other colleges that 
have not merged.  Looking at the scatter plot shows no obvious relationship between 
whether a college has merged and college performance, for any performance 
measure. 
roup 
in each performance group, but we can illustrate the pattern for mergers 
verall. 
anc
 
There are too few mergers to repeat the tables showing probability for each size g
of being 
o
 
Perform e Band (success rate)  
<67% 67 to 7 71 to 7 75% + 
 
in band0 4 
Colleges
 
29m + 19 22 27 32 61
14m to 29m 24 26 25 24 123
Size Ban
(Inco
d 
me 
m) £ Below 14 m 31 26 21 21 59
MERGERS 22 32 27 20 41 
 
 
Performance Ba nspnd (Average I ection))  
4 to 2.75 2.75 to 1.75 1 to 1.
 
in ban 75 
Colleges
d 
29m + 19 27 32 61
14m to 29m 24 25 24 123
Size Ban
(Inco
d 
me 
m) £ Below 14 m 31 21 21 59
MERGERS 39 22 39 23 
 
These tables should be treated with caution given the small number of mergers 
available for comparison, but they do illustrate that the performance of mergers i
spread across the average inspection and success rate band
s 
s, thus there is no 
vidence to suggest that merged institutions perform better. 
how whether there is 
ny evidence to suggest that merged colleges perform better. 
ormation on organisational structure would allow us to say 
ore about performance. 
 
                                                
e
 
Much more detailed data and in-depth analysis is required to s
a
 
It should be noted that whilst we know which colleges have merged, we do not have 
data on organisational structure or the level of collaboration or partnership between 
colleges.  More detailed inf
m
 
19 Some colleges may have merged several times during the period which explains why there 
are fewer merged institutions than there are mergers – e.g. City of Bristol was involved in one 
merger in 1996, another in 2000, and another in 2002. 
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POSSIBLE FURTHER ANALYSES 
 
This paper has presented a descriptive statistical analysis of available data on college 
size and performance.  With more detailed data further analysis may be possible in the 
following areas: 
• Data on Minimum Levels of Performance (MLP) could be included as an 
additional indicator of performance to see whether there is any relationship with 
college size. 
• More detailed OfSTED data may allow us to further disaggregate performance 
and assess the relationship between size and more detailed indicators of 
performance. 
• Analysis of impact of college mergers – with detailed longitudinal data covering 
a sufficient period of time pre and post-merger we could investigate the impact 
of mergers on both size and performance.  If we could collect new data 
(through quantitative research) we may be able to analyse the impact of 
college mergers on local choice and competition. 
• Minimum viable size – quantitative research could attempt to identify whether 
there is a minimum viable size for colleges to operate successfully. 
• Optimal college size – quantitative research could also attempt to identify if 
there is an optimal college size, beyond which colleges operate less efficiently. 
• Modelling the determinants of good college performance – the analysis 
presented here has shown simple relationships between size and performance 
indicators.  A more sophisticated approach could be to use regression analysis 
to model performance using a range of explanatory variables such as size, 
provision mix, demographics, whether institution has merged, geography, local 
labour market conditions, deprivation indices etc. 
• In the future, the implementation of the Framework for Excellence will provide 
data on additional measures of quality across the three areas of 
responsiveness, effectiveness and finance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis presented here shows no strong evidence that bigger is necessarily 
better.  Larger colleges tend to have smaller variation in performance indicators, but 
colleges of any size can achieve poor or outstanding performance. The analysis says 
nothing about causality between college size and performance. 
 
The strongest correlation coefficient is between SLN and average inspection grade (-
0.26), but this represents a relatively weak correlation. 
 
There is no evidence that merged colleges perform any better than colleges that have 
not merged, or better than smaller colleges. 
 
A more detailed programme of analysis and research is required to enable us to better 
understand the relationship between college size and performance. 
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ANNEX 1: REFERENCES USED IN LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
DELNI (2005) Future Size and Structure of the Further Education Sector in 
Northern Ireland – Economic Appraisal Belfast: DELNI 
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DfES (2003) An evaluation of Mergers in the Further Education Sector 1996-2000:  
Nottingham, DFES 
This DfES report, jointly commission with LSC, and carried out by the 
University of Warwick Centre for Education and Industry evaluates a sample of 
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seventeen case study sites. 
 
FEFC (1998) The Financial Benefits of Merger in Further Education Colleges.  
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A summary of merger activity since 1993, factors influencing potential mergers, 
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 In 2007 the LSC completed a ‘rapid review’ of existing evidence on mergers 
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sector.    
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This article reviews merger activity in the further education sector since 
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ANNEX 2: ADDITIONAL CHARTS TO SUPPORT QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Chart 2.2 A1) Size (income) v Leadership & Management grade
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Correlation coefficient = -0.24 
 
Chart 2.2 A2) Size (income) v Quality of provision grade
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Correlation coefficient = -0.22 
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Chart 2.2 A3) Size (income) v Achievements and Standards 
grade
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Correlation coefficient = -0.10 
 
Chart 2.2 A4) Size (income) v Capacity to Improve grade
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Correlation coefficient = -0.23 
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Chart 2.2 A5) Size (income) v Overall Inpsection Grade
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Correlation coefficient = -0.15 
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